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Vincenzo Crupi† and Stephan Hartmann‡ 
 
 
Abstract: This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and 
illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special 
emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory 
and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate 
arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in 
this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further 
examples.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Philosophers of science use a plurality of apparently divergent methods. This claim 
can easily be substantiated by looking into one of the relevant journals: one realizes 
that some authors use the traditional method of conceptual analysis, other engage in 
formal modelling, conduct case studies and – more recently – experiments, or consult 
the history of science in considerable detail. But how do these methods relate to each 
other? Is one of them the right one?  
 
Pluralistic cautions would suggest that multiple methodological approaches are 
legitimate. In fact, we would like to stress that a combination of two or more methods 
may be particularly fruitful in some cases. Carnap, for example, combined formal 
methods (i.e., logic and probability theory) with conceptual analysis to arrive at an 
explication of the notion of confirmation. And authors in the tradition of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend use case studies from the history of science to challenge philosophical 
models of scientific reasoning such as Popper’s falsificationism. In this essay we 
would like to explore how formal methods and experiments can be combined.  
 
Experiments are all the rage in contemporary philosophy (Knobe and Nichols 2008, 
Stotz 2009). In epistemology, people’s intuitions about Gettier cases have famously 
been tested. In ethics, aspects of the freedom of will debate are studied 
experimentally. Philosophers of language also test our intuitions about the reference 
of proper names. This list could easily be continued. Interestingly, the results of these 
studies are often surprising when compared with the corresponding intuitions of 
professional philosophers.  
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While many of these experiments are used to test philosophers’ intuitions (or 
hypotheses), it is worth noting that experiments have other functions besides testing, 
as Hacking (1983) reminded us. Experiments may, for example, inspire new 
hypotheses, and this holds for experimental research in traditional domains as well as 
in philosophy. Usually, these hypotheses are not put forward in a theoretical vacuum: 
they may relate to an existing theoretical framework, and so some tinkering may have 
to be done to fit the new hypothesis (or a modified version of it) into the theoretical 
framework (or a modified version of it). In short, experimental data may provide 
guidance and insight in theory-construction in a number of ways. 
 
This essay is meant to illustrate the claims above. It focuses on experiments and 
experimental phenomena which are directly related to work done by formal 
epistemologists. More specifically, we will look at two case studies. Section 2 focuses 
on confirmation theory and the recent empirical work in this field. Section 3 discusses 
the conjunction fallacy, which is of considerable importance as the rationality debate 
lurks in the background. Finally, we will outline a list of open problems suggesting 
promising lines of research to be pursued further in the future.  
 
 
2. Case-study I: Confirmation 
 
Hypothesis testing and confirmation have been central issues in the philosophy of 
science for decades. Early accounts based on logic and essentially qualitative notions 
have struggled to deal with a number of puzzles, including the “tacking” problem, 
Hempel’s paradoxes, Goodman’s new riddle, the variety of evidence, and the Duhem-
Quine thesis. Importantly, such issues have been shown to receive a more effective 
treatment in quantitative terms within a Bayesian approach to confirmation and 
scientific reasoning (see Earman 1992, pp. 63-86, for a now classical discussion in 
this vein). A quantitative approach also seems to be up to a general real-world 
challenge: judgments concerning the amount (or degree) of support that a piece of 
information brings to a hypothesis are commonly required in scientific research as 
well as in other domains (medicine, law). Thus, a central aim of philosophy of science 
and epistemology is to provide a proper foundation to such judgments. 
 
Bayesianism arguably is a major theoretical perspective in contemporary discussions 
of reasoning in science as well as in other domains (e.g., Bovens and Hartmann 2003, 
Howson and Urbach 2006, Oaksford and Chater 2007). Bayesian theorists postulate a 
probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning by endorsing 
a subjective reading of probability, i.e., by using probabilities to model degrees of 
subjective belief. Within this framework, contemporary Bayesians commonly identify 
confirmation with an increase in the probability of a hypothesis h provided by a piece 
of evidence e as compared to the initial probability of h (i.e., with evidence e not 
being given). A natural way to measure confirmational strength then amounts to a 
function mapping relevant probability values of h and e onto a number which is either 
positive, null or negative depending on p(h|e) being higher, equal or lower as 
compared to p(h). Among traditional proposals meeting this basic constraint are the 
following:1 
                                                 
1 These classical measures trace back to Carnap (1950/1962, p. 361), Keynes (1921, pp. 150-155) and 
Alan Turing (as reported by Good, 1950, pp. 62-63), respectively. 
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– the difference measure: D(h,e) = p(h|e) – p(h) 
– the (log) ratio measure: R(h,e) = log[p(h|e)/p(h)] 
– the (log) likelihood ratio measure: L(h,e) = log[p(e|h)/p(e|¬h)] 
 
More recent variants include the following:2 
 
S(h,e) = p(h|e) – p(h|¬e) 
 
  
€ 
Z(h,e) =
p(h | e) − p(h)
1− p(h)
        if  p(h | e) ≥ p(h)
p(h | e) − p(h)
p(h)
        if  p(h | e) < p(h)
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative Bayesian accounts of confirmation can usefully merge with (and profit 
from) various technical and theoretical refinements and extensions of the Bayesian 
framework, such as the use of Bayesian networks and probability updating upon 
uncertain evidence (e.g., Crupi, Festa and Mastropasqua, 2008). Importantly, 
quantitative measures such as those listed above allow ordinal judgments concerning 
confirmational strength, such as: “hypothesis h receives more empirical support by e1 
than by e2” or “e confirms h1 to a greater extent than h2”. One open problem here is 
that – as both Fitelson (1999) and Festa (1999) emphasized – alternative confirmation 
measures are not generally ordinally equivalent (for a proof concerning a whole set of 
measures including the five above, see Crupi, Tentori and Gonzalez 2007, p. 231). 
Indeed, their implied rankings crucially diverge in various interesting classes of cases. 
This is known as the “problem of measure sensitivity” (Fitelson 1999). 
 
In philosophical quarters, two opposite kinds of reactions can be identified concerning 
the plurality of confirmation measures (Steel 2007). On the one hand, one can bite the 
bullet and take a largely pluralistic stance: different measures reflect different aspects 
of the confirmation relation (e.g., Joyce 2004; Huber 2008; also see Crupi, Festa and 
Buttasi forthcoming). So far, however, it is not quite clear how this form of pluralism 
relates to actual scientific practice and real-world judgments of confirmational 
strength. On the other hand, one may want to argue in favour of the specific properties 
of one particular measure on independent, often intuitive, grounds. As a matter of 
fact, though, intuitions diverge among scholars. So much so that various conflicting 
measures have been defended in this way (see, for instance, Milne 1996, and Fitelson 
2001).  
 
Interestingly, the plurality of confirmation measures has been addressed empirically 
in recent times, fostering a novel line of experimental investigation in the psychology 
of reasoning. The basic idea has been to see whether and how empirical data of naïve 
reasoners’ judgments sort out alternative proposals from the literature in philosophy 
of science and formal epistemology. Two recent papers (Tentori et al. 2007; Crupi, 
                                                 
2 Measure S(h,e) has been independently introduced by Christensen (1999) and Joyce (1999). As 
pointed out in Crupi, Festa and Buttasi (forthcoming), Z(h,e) can be seen as a measure of the relative 
reduction of uncertainty. It has been explicitly advocated by Crupi, Tentori and Gonzalez (2007). Other 
occurrences include Rescher (1958, p. 87), Shortliffe and Buchanan (1984, pp. 248 ff.), Cooke (1991, 
p. 57) and Mura (2006, 2008). 
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Tentori and Gonzalez 2007) report results from the first attempts to test the 
descriptive adequacy of alternative Bayesian measures of confirmation with an urn 
setting experiment and naïve participants (university students). The results seem 
highly interesting. To begin with, this study provides the first neat demonstration that 
probabilistic confirmation (as contrasted to probability tout court) does belong to the 
repertoire of the human mind. Second, it shows that the theoretical divergence among 
confirmation measures is of psychological significance, as competing accounts do 
yield different degrees of predictive accuracy. In particular, measure Z scored as the 
most accurate predictor of elicited confirmation judgments, with a slight advantage 
over the theoretically appealing competitors of likelihood ratio based measures. 
Crupi, Tentori and Gonzalez (2007) also presented normative reasons in favour of Z, 
suggesting that it might eventually be singled out on descriptive and normative 
grounds alike. (It should be noticed that a rather similar scenario is emerging with 
regards to another sophisticated concept from contemporary Bayesian epistemology, 
which is also strictly connected to confirmation, i.e., coherence. We’ll come back to 
the latter issue in Section 4. below)  
 
The interaction with formal philosophy of science also extends to more traditional 
branches of experimental research in cognitive psychology. A case in point is 
represented by the “selection task” (Wason 1966, 1968). Since the very beginning, 
this widely known experimental paradigm was directly inspired by earlier accounts of 
hypothesis testing in the philosophy of science. And indeed, cognitive psychologists 
have recently stressed and explored tight connections with Hempel’s celebrated raven 
paradox (McKenzie and Mikkelsen 2000). For long thought to elicit a basic form of 
“confirmation bias” and irrational behaviour (see, e.g., Manktelow and Over 1993, 
Stich 1990, Stein 1996), the selection task has then been reanalyzed through a 
sophisticated Bayesian account of information search, by which participants’ 
responses have been said to be not only vindicated, but also actually explained as 
arising from cognitive processes reflecting rational data selection (Oaksford and 
Chater 1994; see Oaksford and Chater 2003, and the references therein for major 
contributions to the lively debate on this issue). Indeed, models of the value of 
information (see Nelson 2005) yield important theoretical connections with 
probabilistic confirmation. So much so that other similar accounts of the same 
experimental phenomenon explicitly resort to standard Bayesian measures of  
confirmation (Nickerson 1996, and Fitelson forthcoming). Finally, Bayesian 
confirmation measures have also occurred in debates on normative and behavioural 
aspects of “probative value” in legal contexts (see Davis and Follette 2002, 2003, and 
Kaye and Koehler 2003) as well as in the psychological literature on causal induction 
(see Perales and Shanks 2003). 
 
 
3. Case-study II: The Conjunction Fallacy 
 
The final remarks in the previous section document a growing trend to rely on tools 
from formal epistemology and philosophy of science for a better insight into long 
standing phenomena and puzzles in the empirical study of human cognition. A further 
rich source of relevant considerations arises from the recent literature on yet another 
largely known phenomenon: the conjunction fallacy. In an often quoted illustration, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) had participants faced with the description of a 
character, Linda (31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright, with a major in 
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philosophy and concerns about discrimination, social justice and pacifism), ranking 
the conjunction “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” as 
more probable than “Linda is a bank teller”. From then on, a number of studies have 
reported that, under certain conditions, people may judge a conjunction of hypotheses 
as more probable than one of its conjuncts, contrary to elementary principles of 
probability theory. 
 
The conjunction fallacy has become a key topic in debates on the rationality of human 
reasoning and its limitations. The phenomenon prompted an enormous amount of 
research work in psychology and beyond, like many others achievements from 
Tversky and Kahneman’s research programme, which readily and steadily attracted 
interest from philosophers (Levi 1985; Stich 1990; Samuels, Stich and Bishop 2002) 
and also established the new interdisciplinary field of behavioural economics 
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin 2003).  
 
For more than two decades, psychologists have discussed and empirically explored 
the subtleties of the conjunction fallacy effect, ultimately showing that its robustness 
and recurrence deserve explanation in a satisfactory account of human reasoning and 
judgment (see Sides et al. 2002; Tentori, Bonini and Osherson 2004; Wedell and 
Moro 2008).  
 
A formal analysis accounting for results obtained in the Linda problem has been 
presented by Bovens and Hartmann (2003, pp. 85-88). Briefly put, the proposal is the 
following. Suppose “Linda is a bank teller” and “Linda is a feminist bank teller” are 
reports of two distinct sources of information s1 and s2 which are not perfectly 
reliable. Linda’s description may well suggest that source s1 is less reliable than s2. 
But then, probability theory is consistent with the statement that the probability of 
“bank teller” conditional on the relatively low reliability of s1 is lower than the 
probability of “feminist bank teller” conditional on the relatively high reliability of s2. 
Bovens and Hartmann (2003) submit that this is what participants’ responses express. 
(See Hintikka 2004, for an independent argument along similar lines). More recently, 
Hartmann and Meijs (forthcoming) provided a more sophisticated variant of this 
account, and plan to put it to empirical test. 
 
A different approach has been taken by Crupi, Fitelson and Tentori (2008), following 
and extending some earlier suggestions from both the psychological and philosophical 
literature (e.g., Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2001; Levi 2004). While recognizing that 
conjunction fallacy results document a genuine error in probabilistic judgment, these 
authors have outlined an explanatory framework based on the notion of confirmation, 
meant in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory (see Section 2. above). By a close 
analysis of previous empirical results (Osherson et al. 1990, and Lagnado and Shanks 
2002), they argued that the participants’ fallacious probability judgments might reflect 
the assessment of confirmation relations among the evidence provided and the 
hypotheses at issue in the experimental scenarios. Moreover, extending an earlier 
result by Sides et al. (2002), they showed that, in a whole class of cases including the 
Linda example along with others, Bayesian quantitative models of inductive 
confirmation imply that the evidence provided does support the conjunctive statement 
more than the single conjunct. Roughly, this class of cases is identified by the 
evidence provided (e.g., Linda’s description) confirming the added conjunct 
(“feminist”) but not the isolated one (“bank teller”) (see Tentori and Crupi 2009, for 
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original data in support of this account; Tentori and Crupi forthcoming, and 
Schupbach forthcoming for a debate; and Atkinson, Peijnenburg, and Kuipers 2009 
for some further relevant results). 
 
The latter confirmation-theoretic reading of the Linda problem is one way to flesh out 
the otherwise esoteric statement by Tversky and Kahneman themselves that “feminist 
bank teller is a better hypothesis about Linda than bank teller” (1983, p. 311). A 
different strategy to fill in the blanks of this noteworthy remark has been provided 
Cevolani, Crupi and Festa (forthcoming), suggesting that assessments of expected 
verisimilitude may also crucially contribute to conjunction fallacy results. Indeed, 
these authors proved that, under very weak and plausible assumptions, “feminist bank 
teller”, while less likely to be true than “bank teller”, may well be more likely to be 
close to the whole truth about Linda in a well-defined formal sense. As it can be seen, 
proposed explanations of the conjunction fallacy based on core notions from the 
philosophy of science have literally flourished in recent times. For a further example, 
Shogenji (forthcoming) should be mentioned, who employs a probabilistic and 
quantitative theory of epistemic justification to account for the phenomenon. 
 
 
4. Open Problems and concluding remarks 
 
In this section, we sketch three open problems from the philosophy of science that 
might well gain from a combination of formal and empirical methods.  
 
a. Justification and Coherence. According to the coherence theory of justification, a 
set of propositions (e.g., a scientific theory) is justified if the respective propositions 
cohere with each other. But what does it mean that propositions cohere with each 
other? And how can one measure how much they cohere? To address these questions, 
various measures of coherence have been proposed (Bovens and Hartmann 2003, 
Douven and Meijs 2007). However, there is no consensus in the literature as to what 
the right measure is: different authors appeal to different intuitions or stress different 
formal requirements, and none of the measures on the market satisfies all of them. 
This, in turn, lead to a deadlock of the debate, which needs to be resolved. Inspired by 
the successful work on confirmation measures (see Section 2), empirical investigation 
seems to provide a promising perspective. It will help us to understand better which 
role coherence plays in people’s actual judgments, and which (if any) of the proposed 
measures is psychologically realistic. Empirical studies may also foster the 
construction of alternative measures, or the refinement of existing ones. Notably, 
original experimental procedures to compare different quantitative accounts of 
coherence have been recently devised by Harris and Hahn (forthcoming).  
 
b. Scientific explanation. The debate about scientific explanation is in a similar 
situation. Here we find a spectrum of different theories, supported by altogether 
different philosophical background beliefs. In this situation, empirical studies may stir 
the debate in a new direction. More specifically, the following philosophically 
relevant questions seem to be worth addressing experimentally: Which role do 
simplicity, probability and coherence play in explanations? And how do people assess 
the strength of an explanation? The resulting findings will help evaluating existing 
theories of explanation and may inspire new ones. For some preliminary work in this 
direction, see Lombrozo (2006) and Schupbach and Sprenger (2009). 
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c. Social epistemology and philosophy of science. Social epistemology studies the 
social aspects of science from an epistemological point of view. To do so, case studies 
have been conducted and formal models have been constructed (see, e.g., Lehrer and 
Wagner 1981, and Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger 2009). These studies should be 
accompanied by empirical investigations, as some “empirical input” is needed to 
answer questions such as the following: What is the best way to proceed when 
different scientists disagree? Philosophers and decision theorists developed a host of 
models that reflect certain ideals of rationality. These models are typically a priori, 
i.e., they do not include any empirical information about the deliberation process. 
Conducting experiments will help us to better understand how deliberation works and, 
eventually, how deliberation should work if the goal of the committee in question is to 
make the right decision.  
 
Most of the examples above illustrate ongoing trends of research, fostering (and 
requiring) much further work to provide fully established results. For our present 
purposes, however, two connected remarks can be firmly put forward. First, the 
theoretical toolbox of researchers empirically investigating human cognition and 
behaviour is being expanded from basic probability theory to more advanced formal 
notions with distinct philosophical origins. Second, a number of recent and current 
empirical investigations have a potential to provide a fresh look on traditional 
concerns addressed by formal epistemology and philosophy of science. 
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